

The Research Centre of the Faculty of Economics
cordially invites you to a research seminar
on **Wednesday, 3rd October 2018**
at **1 p.m.** in **Senate Conference Room**
at the **Faculty of Economics, University of Ljubljana**

Author:

Sven Hoepfner, Ghent University

Russell Korobkin, University of California Los Angeles (UCLA)

Alexander Stremitzer, ETH Zurich

will present the article:

“Delegated Promises”

“In this paper we provide experimental evidence that agency relationships that pervade collective entities may actually boost the effects of promise-keeping. This is because a corporation’s agents may feel the moral force of the promises they make on behalf of the corporation. This would make it psychologically costly for them to break such promises, while the cost of keeping the promises would be borne by the corporation rather than its agents (at least in the absence of high powered incentives). In other words, even if the moral force of promise keeping only amounted to an “epsilon”, a party can leverage this “epsilon” into a strong form of commitment by delegating promise-making to an agent and providing this agent with low-powered incentives.”

You can register for the free seminar by phone (01) 58-92-490, or via e-mail:
research.seminars@ef.uni-lj.si by Tuesday, 2nd October 2018.

You can find all information regarding future research seminars on following link:
http://www.ef.uni-lj.si/raziskovanje/seminarji_in_konference

We look forward to seeing you!

